

Sporadic Democracy: Education, Democracy and the Question of Inclusion
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Abstract

In this paper I take up the question of the relationship between democracy and inclusion. I present the deliberative turn in democratic theory as an attempt to overcome ‘external exclusion’ and discuss Iris Young’s work as an attempt to overcome ‘internal exclusions.’ I argue that although attempts to make democracy more inclusive are laudable, they are ultimately based upon a colonial conception of democratisation, one in which inclusion is seen as a process where those who are already on the inside include others into their sphere. I use the work of Jacques Rancière to argue for an understanding of democratisation as the interruption of the existing political order from the outside in the name of equality. This can not only help us to think differently about the role of inclusion in democracy. It also urges us to see that there are opportunities for the democratisation of education that lie beyond the inclusion of ‘newcomers’ into the existing democratic order.

“The guarantee of democracy is not the filling up of all the dead times and empty spaces by the forms of participation or of counterpower: it is the continual renewal of the actors and of the forms of their actions, the ever-open possibility of the fresh emergence of this fleeting subject.”
Jacques Rancière (1995 p.61)

1. Democracy and Inclusion

It could well be argued that inclusion is one of the core values, if not *the* core value of democracy. The ‘point’ of democracy, after all, is the inclusion of everyone (the whole *demos*) into the ruling (*kratein*) of society. This is why Pericles defined democracy as the situation in which “power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people” (Held 1987, p.16) and it is why Aristotle wrote about democracy as the “rule of all over each and of each by turns over all” (ibid., p.19). Inclusion also affects the legitimacy of democracy because, as Iris Young has pointed out, the normative legitimacy of democratic decision-making precisely depends “on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the decision-making processes and have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes” (Young 2000, pp.5-6).

Inclusion is not only the main point and purpose of democracy; it is also one of its main problems. The question that has haunted democracy from day one (and in a sense already troubled democracy before it took off) is the question ‘Who are to be included in the (definition of the) *demos*?’ This is the question of *democratic citizenship* and we know all too well that in the city-state of Athens citizenship was a highly restricted affair. Only Athenian men over the age of 20 were eligible for citizenship. Women, children, slaves (who made up about 60% of the population) and immigrants, even from families who had settled in Athens several generations earlier, were simply excluded from political participation (Held 1987, p.23).

On the one hand the history of democracy can be written as a continuous quest for inclusion. Some of the most powerful and successful social movements of the last century – including the women’s movement and the labour movement – have precisely mobilised “around demands for oppressed and marginalized people to be included as full and equal citizens” (Young 2000, p.6). But the history of democracy is at the very same time a history of *exclusion*. In some cases exclusion is justified in the name of democracy. This is, for example, the case with *liberal* democracy where the democratic principle of popular rule (expressing the principle of *equality*) is qualified by a set of basic liberties that take priority over popular rule in order to make sure that popular rule does not restrain or obstruct individual freedom (thus expressing the principle of *liberty*) (Gutmann 1993, p.413). Whereas liberal democracy seeks to exclude certain *outcomes* of democratic decision-making (and thus would exclude those who would argue for such outcomes), there is also a more direct link between democracy and exclusion. The overriding argument here focuses on those who are deemed not to be ‘fit’ for democracy, either because they lack certain qualities that are considered to be fundamental for democratic participation – such as rationality or reasonableness (see below) – or because they do not subscribe to the ideal of democracy itself.

As Bonnie Honig (1993) has argued, this is not only an issue for communitarians who wish to see democratic politics organised around particular political identities. It is also an issue for liberals since they tend to restrict political participation to those who are willing and able to act in a rational way and who are willing to leave their substantive conceptions of the good life behind them in the private sphere. Such strategies not only result in the exclusion of those who are considered to be ‘sub-rational’ (e.g., certain categories of psychiatric patients) or unreasonable. They are also used to justify the exclusion of those who we might call ‘pre-rational’ or, in a more general sense, ‘pre-democratic,’ and children are the most obvious example of such a category. It is here, then, that there is an important link with education, because democratic education is often seen as the process that should make individuals ‘ready’ for their participation in democratic decision-making (for a critical discussion of this view of democratic education see Biesta & Lawy 2006; Biesta 2006; Biesta 2007).

In this paper I ask what it means for democracy to be inclusive and I discuss how democracy might become more inclusive – although I will argue that, in a sense, this is the wrong question. I start with an overview of recent developments in democratic theory, focusing on the deliberative turn (Dryzek) and the work of Iris Young. I argue that although these developments have the potential to make democratic deliberation and decision-making more inclusive, they rely on a set of assumptions which, from the point of view of inclusion, are problematic. I then turn to the work of Jacques Rancière to explore a different way to understand the relationship between inclusion and democracy. In the concluding section I argue why Rancière’s approach is important, both for our understanding of democracy and for our understanding of democratic education.

2. The role of inclusion in democratic theory

The question of inclusion plays a central role in discussions about political decision-making. In contemporary political theory there are two main models of democratic decision-making: the *aggregative* model and the *deliberative* model (see Young 2000, pp.18-26; Elster 1998, p.6). The first model sees democracy as a process of aggregating the preferences of individuals, often, but not exclusively, in choosing public officials and policies. A central assumption is that the preferences of individuals should be seen as

given and that politics is only concerned with the aggregation of preferences, often, but not exclusively, on the basis of majority rule. Where these preferences come from, whether they are valid or not, and whether they are held for egoistic or altruistic reasons, is considered to be irrelevant. The *aggregative* model assumes, in other words, “that ends and values are subjective, non-rational, and exogenous to the political process” and that democratic politics is basically “a competition between private interests and preferences” (Young 2000, p.22).

Over the past two decades an increasing number of political theorists have argued that democracy should not be confined to the simple aggregation of preferences but should involve the *deliberative transformation* of preferences. Under the deliberative model democratic decision-making is seen as a process which involves “decision making by means of arguments offered *by* and *to* participants” (Elster 1998, p.8) about the means *and* the ends of collective action. As Young explains, deliberative democracy is not about “determining what preferences have greatest numerical support, but [about] determining which proposals the collective agrees are supported by the best reasons” (Young 2000, p.23). The reference to ‘best reasons’ indicates – and this is very important – that deliberative democracy is based upon a particular conception of deliberation. Dryzek, for example, acknowledges that deliberation can cover a rather broad spectrum of activities but argues that for *authentic* deliberation to happen the requirement is that the reflection on preferences should take place in a *non-coercive* manner (Dryzek 2000, p.2). This requirement, so he explains, “rules out domination via the exercise of power, manipulation, indoctrination, propaganda, deception, expression of mere self-interest, threats ... and attempts to impose ideological conformity” (ibid.). This resonates with Elster’s claim that deliberative democracy is about the giving and taking of arguments by participants “who are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality” (Elster 1998, p.8) and with his suggestion that deliberation must take place between “free, equal and rational agents” (ibid. p.5).

In one respect the ‘deliberative turn’ (or re-turn; see Dryzek 2000, pp.1-2) is an important step forward in democratic theory and democratic practice. On the one hand it seems to be a more full expression of the basic values of democracy, particularly the idea that democracy is about actual participation in collective decision-making. In the aggregative model there is, after all, little participation, and decision-making is mainly algorithmic. On the other hand, the deliberative approach seems to have a much stronger educational potential. In the deliberative model “political actors not only express preferences and interest, but they *engage* with one another about how to balance these under circumstances of inclusive equality” (Young 2000, p.26; *emph. added*). Such interaction “requires participants to be open and attentive to one another, to justify their claims and proposals in terms of [being] acceptable to all, the orientation of participants moves from self-regard to an orientation to what is publicly assertable” (ibid.). Thus “people often gain new information, learn different experiences of their collective problems, or find that their own initial opinions are founded on prejudice and ignorance, or that they have misunderstood the relation of their own interests to others” (ibid.). As Warren has put it, participation in deliberation can make individuals “more public-spirited, more tolerant, more knowledgeable, more attentive to the interests of others, and more probing of their own interests” (Warren 1992, p.8). Deliberative democracy, so its proponents argue, is therefore not only more *democratic* but also more *educative*. A third asset of deliberative democracy lies in its potential impact on the *motivation* of political actors in that participation in democratic decision-making is more likely to

commit participants to its outcomes. This suggests that deliberative democracy is not only an intrinsically desirable way of social problem-solving but probably also an effective way of doing this (see Dryzek 2000, p. 172).

The deliberative turn can be seen as an attempt to bring democracy closer to its core values and in this respect represents an important correction to the individualism and ‘disconnected pluralism’ (Biesta 2006) of the aggregative model and of liberal democracy more generally. However, by raising the stakes of democracy, deliberative democracy has also brought the difficulty of democratic inclusion into much sharper focus, and thus has generated – ironically but not surprisingly – a series of problems around the question of inclusion. The main issue here centres on the *entry conditions for participation* in deliberation. The authors quoted above all seem to suggest that participation in democratic deliberation should be regulated and that it should be confined to those who commit themselves to a particular set of values and behaviours. Young, for example, argues that the deliberative model “entails several normative ideas for the relationships and dispositions of deliberating parties, among them inclusion, equality, reasonableness, and publicity” which, so she claims, “are all *logically* related in the deliberative model” (Young 2000, p.23; *emph added*). Most of the proponents of (versions of) deliberative democracy specify a set of entry conditions for participation, although what is interesting about the discussion is that most go at great pains to delineate a *minimum* set of conditions necessary for democratic deliberation rather than an ideal set (see, e.g., the contributions in Elster 1998). Young provides an interesting example with her distinction between reasonableness (which she sees as a necessary entry condition) and rationality (which she doesn’t see as a necessary condition). For Young being reasonable doesn’t entail being rational. Reasonableness refers to “a set of *dispositions* that discussion participants have [rather] than to the substance of people’s contributions to debate” (Young 2000, p.24; *emph. added*). She concedes that reasonable people “often have crazy ideas,” yet “what makes them reasonable is their willingness to listen to others who want to explain to them why their ideas are incorrect or inappropriate” (*ibid.*). In Young’s hands reasonableness thus emerges as a communicative *virtue*, and not as a criterion for the logical ‘quality’ of people’s preferences and convictions.

This example not only shows why the issue of inclusion is so prominent in the deliberative model. It also explains why the deliberative turn has generated a whole new set of issues around inclusion. The reason for this is that deliberation is not simply a form of political decision-making but first and foremost a form of political *communication*. The inclusion question in deliberative democracy is therefore not so much a question about who should be included – although this question should be asked always as well. It is first and foremost a question about who is able to participate effectively in deliberation. As Dryzek aptly summarises, the suspicion about deliberative democracy is “that its focus on a particular kind of reasonable political interaction is not in fact neutral, but systematically excludes a variety of voices from effective participation in democratic politics” (Dryzek 2000, p.58). In this regard Young makes a helpful distinction between two forms of exclusion: *external exclusion*, which is about “how people are [actually] kept outside the process of discussion and decision-making,” and *internal exclusion* where people are formally included in decision-making processes but where they may find, for example, “that their claims are not taken seriously and may believe that they are not treated with equal respect” (Young 2000, p.55). Internal exclusion, in other words, refers to those situations in which people “lack effective

opportunity to influence the thinking of others even when they have access to fora and procedures of decision-making” (ibid.) which can particularly be the outcome of the emphasis of some proponents of deliberative democracy on “dispassionate, unsituated, neutral reason” (ibid. p.63).

To counteract the internal exclusion that is the product of a too narrow focus on argument, Young has suggested several other modes of political communication which should be added to the deliberative process not only to remedy “exclusionary tendencies in deliberative practices” but also to promote “respect and trust” and to make possible “understanding across structural and cultural difference” (ibid. p.57). The first of these is *greeting* or *public acknowledgement*. This is about “communicative political gestures through which those who have conflicts ... *recognize* others as included in the discussion, especially those with whom they differ in opinion, interest, or social location” (ibid. p.61; *emph. in original*). Young emphasises that greeting should be thought of as a starting-point for political interaction. It “*precedes* the giving and evaluating of reasons” (ibid. p.79) and does so through the recognition of the other parties in the deliberation. The second mode of political communication is *rhetoric* and more specifically the affirmative use of rhetoric (ibid. p.63). Although one could say that rhetoric only concerns the form of political communication and not its content, the point Young makes is that inclusive political communication should pay attention to and be inclusive about the different forms of expression and should not try to purify rational argument from rhetoric. Rhetoric is not only important because it can help to get particular issues on the agenda for deliberation. Rhetoric can also help to articulate claims and arguments “*in ways appropriate to a particular public in a particular situation*” (ibid. p.67; *emph. in original*). Rhetoric always accompanies an argument by situating it “for a particular audience and giving it embodied style and tone” (ibid. p.79). Young’s third mode of political communication is *narrative* or *storytelling*. The main function of narrative in democratic communication lies in its potential “to foster understanding among members of a polity with very different experience or assumptions about what is important” (ibid. p.71). Young emphasises the role of narrative in the teaching and learning dimension of political communication. “Inclusive democratic communication,” so she argues, “assumes that all participants have something to teach the public about the society in which they dwell together” and also assumes “that all participants are ignorant of some aspects of the social or natural world, and that everyone comes to a political conflict with some biases, prejudices, blind spots, or stereo-types” (ibid. p.77).

It is important to emphasise that greeting, rhetoric and narrative are not meant to *replace* argumentation. Young stresses again and again that deliberative democracy entails “that participants require reasons of one another and critically evaluate them” (ibid. p.79). Other proponents of the deliberative model take a much more narrow approach and see deliberation exclusively as a form of *rational* argumentation (e.g., Benhabib 1996) where the only legitimate force should be the “forceless force of the better argument” (Habermas). Similarly, Dryzek, after a discussion of Young’s ideas,[1] concludes that argument always has to be central to deliberative democracy” (Dryzek 2000, p.71). Although he acknowledges that other modes of communication can be present and that there are good reasons to welcome them, their status is different “because they do not *have to be present*” (ibid., *emph added*). For Dryzek at the end of the day all modes of political communication must live up to the standards of rationality. This does not mean that they must be subordinated to rational argument “but their deployment only makes

sense in a context where argument about what is to be done remains central” (ibid. p.168).

3. Can democracy become ‘normal’?

This brief overview of inclusion reveals the progress that has been made over the past two decades around the question of democratic inclusion. But this is not to suggest that there are no problems left with the direction in which the discussion about democratic inclusion is moving – and these problems, so I wish to suggest, are not merely practical but have to do with more fundamental assumptions that underlie the discourse about democracy and inclusion. There are two assumptions which, in my view, are particularly problematic.

One assumption is the belief that democracy can become a ‘normal’ situation. In the discussion about inclusion the main challenge seems to be perceived as a *practical* one, i.e., as the question how we can make our democratic practices even more inclusive (internal inclusion) and how we can include even more people into the sphere of democratic deliberation (external inclusion). The assumption here is that if we can become even more attentive to otherness and difference we will eventually reach a situation of total democratic inclusion, a situation in which democracy has become ‘normal.’ While people may have different views about when and how this situation might be reached and whether or not there will always be some ‘remainders’ (Mouffe 1993), the idea that democratisation means including more and more people into the sphere of democracy reveals the underlying idea that the best democracy is the most inclusive democracy, and reveals the underlying assumption that democracy can and should become a normal political reality.

This relates to a second assumption, which is the idea that inclusion should be understood as a process in which those who stand outside of the sphere of democracy should be brought into this sphere and, more importantly, should be included by those who are already on the inside. The assumption here is that inclusion is a process which happens ‘from the inside out,’ a process which emanates from the position of those who are already considered to be democratic. The very language of inclusion not only suggests that someone is including someone else. It also suggests – and this, of course, is familiar terrain for those who work in the field of inclusive education – that someone is setting the terms for inclusion and that it is for those who wish to be included to meet those terms.

There is, of course, no need to throw out the baby of deliberative democracy with the bathwater of theoretical purity, and this is definitely not my intention. Deliberative democracy clearly has many advantages over other political practices and processes. But the question we should ask is whether the underlying assumptions about democracy result in the best and, so we might say, most democratic way to understand and ‘do’ democracy. The first step in answering this question is to ask whether democracy can be understood differently. One author who has tried to approach the question of democracy in a way that is indeed different from the prevailing discourse about democracy and inclusion is Jacques Rancière.

4. Rancière on democracy and democratisation

Whereas in the prevailing discourse democracy is seen as something that can be permanent and normal, Rancière argues for an understanding of democracy as *sporadic*,

as something that only ‘happens’ from time to time and in very particular situations (see Rancière 1995, p.41; p.61). To clarify this point Rancière makes a distinction between politics – which for him always means *democratic* politics (democracy as “the institution of politics itself” – Rancière 1999, p.101) – and what he refers to as *police* or *police order*. In a way that is reminiscent of Foucault, Rancière defines the police as “an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and that sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task” (Rancière 1999, p.29). It is an order “of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise” (ibid.). Police should not be understood as the way in which the state structures the life of society. It is not, in Habermasian terms, the ‘grip’ of the system on the lifeworld, but includes *both*. As Rancière explains, “(t)he distribution of places and roles that defines a police regime stems as much from the assumed spontaneity of social relations as from the rigidity of state functions” (ibid.). One way to read this definition of police is to think of it as an order that is *all-inclusive* in that everyone has a particular place, role or position in it. This is not to say that everyone is included in the running of the order. The point simply is that no one is excluded from the order. After all, women, children, slaves and immigrants had a clear place in the democracy of Athens, viz., as those who were not allowed to participate in political decision making. In precisely this respect every police order is all-inclusive.

Against this background Rancière then defines *politics* as the disruption of the police order in the name of equality. This may sound simpler than what Rancière has in mind, so it is important to be clear about the kind of disruption politics represents. Rancière explains that he reserves the term ‘politics’ “for an extremely determined activity antagonistic to policing: whatever breaks with the tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or lack of them are defined by a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in that configuration” (ibid., pp.30-31). This break is manifest in a series of actions “that reconfigure the space where parties, parts, or lack of parts have been defined.” (ibid. p.31). Political activity so conceived is “whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it” (ibid.). “It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard [and understood; G.B.] a discourse where once there was only place for noise.” (ibid.)

(P)olitical activity is always a mode of expression that undoes the perceptible divisions of the police order by implementing a basically heterogeneous assumption, that of a part of those who have no part, an assumption that, at the end of the day, itself demonstrates the sheer contingency of the order [and] the equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being. (ibid)

Politics thus refers to the event when two ‘heterogeneous processes’ meet: the police process and the process of *equality* (see ibid.).

There are two points to add to this account. The first is that for Rancière politics understood in this way is always *democratic* politics. Democracy, so he argues, “is not a regime or a social way of life” – it is not and cannot be, in other words, part of the police order – but should rather be understood “as the institution of politics itself” (ibid. p.101). Every politics is democratic *not* in the sense of a set of institutions, but in the sense of forms of expression “that confront the logic of equality with the logic of the police order” (ibid.). Democracy, so we might say, is a ‘claim’ for equality.

But this raises a further question about Rancière's understanding of democracy, which is the question about *who* it is that makes this claim. Who, in other words, 'does' politics or 'performs' democracy?[2] The point of asking the question in this way is not to suggest that there is no subject of politics, that there are no democratic actors involved in democracy. The point is that political actors – or subjects – do not exist *before* the 'act' of democracy, or to be more precise: their political identity, their identity as democratic subjects only comes into being in and through the act of disruption of the police order. This is why Rancière argues that politics is itself a process of *subjectification*. It is a process in and through which political subjects are constituted. Rancière defines subjectification as "the production through a series of actions of a body and a capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable within a given field of experience, whose identification is thus part of the reconfiguration of the field of experience" (ibid. p.35).

Democracy – or to be more precise: the appearance of democracy – is therefore not simply the situation in which a group who has previously been excluded from the realm of politics steps forward to claim its place under the sun. It is at the very same time the *creation* of a group as group with a particular identity that didn't exist before. Democratic activity is, for example, to be found in the activity of nineteenth-century workers "who established a collective basis for work relations" that were previously seen as "the product of an infinite number of relationships between private individuals" (ibid. p.30). Democracy thus establishes new, *political* identities. Or as Rancière puts it: "Democracy is the designation of subjects that do not coincide with the parties of the state or of society" (ibid. pp.99-100). This means that "the place where the people appear" is the place "where a dispute is conducted" (ibid. p.100). The political dispute is distinct from all conflicts of interest between constituted parties of the population, for it is a conflict "over the very count of those parties." (ibid.) It is a dispute between "the police logic of the distribution of places and the political logic of the egalitarian act" (ibid.). Politics is therefore "primarily a conflict over the existence of a common stage and over the existence and status of those present on it" (ibid. pp.26-27).

For Rancière, therefore, democratisation is *not* a process that emanates from the centre and extends to the margins. It is not a process in which those who are already democratic – an impossible position from Rancière's point of view anyway – include others into their sphere. Rather democracy appears as a claim from the 'outside,' a claim based upon the perception of injustice, or of what Rancière refers to as a 'wrong,' a claim made in the name of equality. Those who make the claim do not simply want to be included in the existing order; they want to *redefine* the order in such a way that *new* identities, new ways of doing and being become possible and can be 'counted.' This means that for Rancière democratisation is no longer a process of inclusion of excluded parties into the existing order; it rather is a transformation of that order in the name of equality. The impetus for this transformation does not come from the inside but rather from the outside. But it is important to see that, unlike in the prevailing discourse about democratic inclusion, this outside is not a 'known' outside. Democratisation is, after all, not a process that happens *within* the police order in which it is perfectly clear who are taking part in decision-making and who are not. Democratisation is a process that *disrupts* the existing order from a place that could not be expressed or articulated from within this order.

It is, finally, important to see that for Rancière the purpose of democracy and the ‘point’ of democratisation is not to create constant chaos and disruption. Although Rancière would maintain that democratisation is basically a good thing, this does not mean that the police order is necessarily bad. Although this may not be very prominent in Rancière’s work, he does argue that democratisation can have a positive effect on the police order. Democratic disputes do produce what he refers to as “inscriptions of equality” (ibid., 100); they leave traces behind in the (transformed) police order. This is why Rancière emphasises that “(t)here is a worse and a better police” (ibid. pp.30-31). The better one is, however, not the one “that adheres to the supposedly natural order of society or the science of legislators” – it is the one “that all the breaking and entering perpetrated by egalitarian logic has most jolted out of its ‘natural’ logic” (ibid. p.31). Rancière thus acknowledges that the police “can produce all sorts of good, and one kind of police may be infinitely preferable to another” (ibid. p.31). But, so he concludes, whether the police is ‘sweet and kind’ does not make it any less the opposite of politics (see ibid.).

5. Conclusions

In this paper I have indicated two problems with the way in which inclusion has been thematised in recent developments in democratic theory. Both problems are related, since they both have to do with a particular understanding of the process of *democratisation*. As I have shown, democratisation is basically understood as a process through which those who are not yet part of the sphere of democracy become included in it. This, as I have argued, suggests that the envisaged end-point for democracy is the situation in which *everyone* is included, the situation in which democracy has become the normal political situation. It also suggests a set up in which some are already inside the ‘sphere’ of democracy and where it is up to them to include others into *their* practice.

I have shown that there are several problems with this understanding of democracy and democratisation. The main problem is that it is premised on the idea that we – and the key-question is of course who the ‘we’ here is – already know what democracy is and that inclusion is nothing more than bringing more people into the existing democratic order. This is basically a colonial way to understand democratisation and it is precisely the logic behind what I see as the imperialistic expansion of (a certain definition of) democracy which is currently happening at the geo-political level. The main problem with this approach is that the political order itself, the democracy in which others are being included, is taken for granted; it is the starting-point that itself cannot be questioned. This is not only a problem for international politics. It is at the same time a problem for those forms of democratic education which operate on the assumption that it is the task of democratic education to include children and other ‘newcomers’ into the existing democratic order by facilitating a transition from a pre-rational and pre-democratic stage to a stage at which children have met the entry conditions for their future participation in democracy.

The importance of Rancière’s work lies precisely in the fact that he puts this way of thinking about democracy and inclusion on its head. For him democracy is not a normal situation, i.e., it is not a way in which the police order exists, but rather occurs in the interruption of the order in the name of equality – which is why he says that democracy is sporadic. Furthermore, democratisation for Rancière is not something that is done *to* others; it is something that people can only do themselves. Rancière

connects this to the question of emancipation. Emancipation, he writes, means “escaping from a minority” (Rancière 1995, p.48). But he adds to this that “nobody escapes from the social minority save by their own efforts” (ibid.). Thirdly, Rancière helps us to see that we should understand democratic inclusion not in terms of adding more people to the existing order, but rather as a process that necessarily involves the transformation of that order. As long as we restrict our inclusive efforts to those who are known to be excluded, we only operate within the existing order. This, so I wish to emphasise, is definitely not *unimportant* because, as Rancière reminds us, there is a worse and a better police. But what Rancière provides us with is an understanding of the need for a different kind of inclusion: the inclusion of what cannot be known to be excluded in terms of the existing order; the inclusion of what I have elsewhere referred to as the ‘incalculable’ (see Biesta 2001).

Why and how do these ideas matter for education and, more importantly, for democratic education? In my view it is first of all of the utmost importance in the current political climate to have ways of thinking and ‘doing’ democratic education that are precisely *not* informed by a colonial view of democratic education. Rancière at the very least shows us that it is possible to understand the relationship between democracy, democratisation and inclusion differently, in a way that is far less tainted by a colonial frame of mind. Rancière also helps us to see that there is a choice. Democratic education can either play a role in the police order – and I wish to emphasise that there is important work to be done there as well – or it can try to link up with experiences and practices of democratisation that come from the ‘outside’ and interrupt the democratic order in the name of equality. Instead of teaching children and young people to be ‘good democrats’ – which, in my view, is a strategy that basically remains within the police order – educators may well have a role to play in utilising and supporting the learning opportunities in those incalculable moments when democratisation ‘occurs.’ That such moments might occur as the interruption of attempts to teach democracy – even if it is a teaching based on deliberative idea(l)s – is, in my view, something that goes without saying.

Notes

1. Dryzek refers to work published by Young before her *Inclusion and Democracy*. Several of the issues Dryzek raises about Young’s position seem no longer to be part of the position she takes in *Inclusion and Democracy*.
2. I am aware that this is a rather clumsy way of putting the question, but it is consistent with Rancière’s line of thinking. He himself writes at some point about “(t)he people through which democracy occurs” (Rancière 1999, p.99).

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